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Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER:

HENRY J. STEINER

MODERATOR:

TRAI LE

SPEECH:

"IDEALS AND COUNTER-IDEALS IN THE STRUGGLE
OVER AUTONOMY REGIMES FOR MINORITIES"

DATE:

MARCH 1, 1991

Professor Le: On behalf of the audience I would like to thank you
for that presentation. I would like to make just two comments;
they will be very short, and I believe there are a lot of questions,
so I will leave the floor to you.
Now, my first remark pertains to the distinction you make
between so-called core rights, or individual rights, which you define as negative rights-rights not to be tortured and so forth-as
individual rights, and rights of groups. It seems to me that if a
philosopher has defined man as a social animal, I do not see how
we can take the individual out of the context of the group. Maybe
that distinction between core rights, as pertaining to the individual
per se, and group rights is not truly a distinction in view of the
context in which the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights arose.
It seems that the emphasis should not s6 much be on the
individual as it should be on the question of discrimination based
on race, religion, and so forth. I would look at the Covenant in
that context and spirit. That is my first remark.
The second remark is that I do not really see the contradiction between the rights of individuals and rights of groups, as
opposed to the human rights of all humankind, if the purpose is
to advance certain types of values and rights. Before you can be
recognized as a group, it seems that the question of participation
becomes a moot question. That is my second remark.
Professor Steiner. Let me say that I do believe the Covenant contemplates significant social or group activities. I think that one of the
great fears has been that people are swallowed up by their group
identities, and lose their individual identity. The individual becomes the object of the community rather than being the subject
of a human right. We see these tensions in the world today between duties and rights, between communities and individuals,
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within different religions and cultures. Nonetheless, I think we
need to recognize that we humans must have intercourse with
others, in every sense of the word, to survive as human beings and
to grow. We need political exchange, we need cultural exchange,
we need all sorts of links to and associations with other people.
Assuming these are all permitted, group identities will remain
strong, but I would not go so far as to say that the individual
must be swallowed up in the communal identity. Ultimately, there
is the sense that the individual is supreme. I think these covenants
reflect their western origin in expressing this ultimate judgment.
I think we must keep the sense of adventure and promise in
life. We must guard against the world's becoming divided into
constituencies that just want to protect themselves against interchange and growth-that want to go back in history rather than
forward, or to hold it just where they are. I do not think any
great culture to this day has prospered in that way. I do not think
humanity has prospered as a whole in that way. So the question is
how individuals participate in social life. It may well be that certain kinds of group claims are very plausible.
Participant.Two of the cultures that I have done field work in are
India and, last year, South Africa; these are cultures that have
developed two of the most stratified systems of group rights, or
the group concept of rights. Perhaps some of the dangers you are
pointing out are indeed apparent there. I just wanted to make two
observations. One is that the very word "individual" is itself one of
the ways we think about what a person is. That is, the word "individual" seems to carry with it a kind of concept of a unity that is
not separable, which, in fact, has rights without reference to
groups and so forth. And one of the leading anthropologists in
Indian culture points out that in India, for example, the concept
of the person is really more and is better expressed as the concept of the individual.
I would suggest that perhaps this very concept, this idea that
you can look both ways at people, both as social beings and also
as entities who carry their own rights without reference to their
groups, is one of those sorts of fundamental facts with which we
will constantly have to live. There may be no real way to avoid the
problem because of the cultural nature of human beings.
I was struck by the fact that in these two cultures, India and
South Africa, it is precisely group rights that are the problem. In
fact, this concept of group rights has been specifically rejected
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because of the fact that this course has been used by whites to
suggest, in the future of South Africa, that their rights as a group
need to be protected. And civilly, reverse discrimination in India,
as you know, also causes so many problems that it will probably be
a continuing theme.
Professor Steiner. I have no doubt that some of my beliefs have been
influenced by my Western origin. I simply could not be giving the
same talk if I had been born a Muslim in, say, India. Communalism is not my cultural experience in this country, but I do not
believe that what I suggested is inconsistent with their being powerful but voluntary communities. Who knows what voluntary is? I
am born what I am, and never was given choice. To extract or
isolate myself from my heritage-for example, to move out of the
Hindu community in India-may be legally permitted, but may
not be sociologically possible in terms of one's own life. For a
Turk to cross the line in Cyprus and marry a Greek may be not
just ill advised, but fatal in a given situation of ethnic hostility. So
the notion of what is voluntary and what is coerced, of belonging
to a community by choice or necessity, is a very complex one.
Participant: I would like to point to a specific problem in this
country between group rights and the rights of a specific ethnic
group to exercise its own culture. The whole development of
women's rights, the right of a woman not to be discriminated
against, causes a dilemma when there is a claim of a specific ethnic entity to exercise its own ethnic identity. In a patriarchal society, there is a very strong conflict between these claims.
I also want to point out that the right to be the same is the
same as having economic and political equality. The right to be
different is a right you can only exercise with other people with
the same right. For example, language: if you speak a language,
you can only exercise that right with other people who also speak
that language. It is not a question of rejecting group rights as
such, but it is a question of speaking of rights in an individual
sense, as an individual entitlement, and then protecting that specific right so that you can exercise it within a group.
Professor Steinen You can see a lot of these rights as either individual or collective, and the notion of gender discrimination is a very
good example.
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Should a group's self-determination, in some fashion, trump
other notions that are considered fundamental in the West? For
example, the argument can be made that insistence on gender
equality is inconsistent with the freedom of religion that is assured
by the Covenant. You can see how these conflicts come up within
the very core of the Covenant. A man could argue that it is not
that he wants a lot of control over women, but that he is simply
repeating what he has been taught by his religion. If he is a believer, an outside analyst may find all kinds of ideological, and
economic, and political explanations of his belief, but he may also
be manifesting elements of profound and deep belief. All religions
have beliefs which are so fundamental.
So what is deprivation of human rights? Do you view deprivation from a perspective outside the culture or from within the
culture? For example, are women within Islamic culture free to
choose in a Western human rights sense until they become aware
of the possibilities of change of their status? Are they free if they
then prefer to remain in their status within traditional Islam? Is
the infusion of Western norms itself a horrendous assault on the
structure of Islam?
Terrible contradictions arise when systems are simply in irreconcilable conflict given the premises of the universality of the
human rights movement.
Participant: I think it is just an argument for equal protection, or
is our Constitution just as color blind? You said that it is dangerous to create a group autonomy right because it perpetuates the
barbed wire between groups. You said that this might be good because putting the barbed wire in will stop bloodshed, or the conflict between the groups. Will it ever be possible to get rid of the
barbed wire, or are you perpetuating the split more by leaving it
in?
Professor Steiner Well, that's certainly one of the fears that I expressed in my talk, which relates to what was discussed in Professor Chen's talk. If you treat the state as necessarily the highest
good, which not very many people do, and if you say the state is
the supreme realizer of human values, then break-downs of that
state constitute something very serious. The state is sometimes a
defender of human values, but it is often oppressive and insistent
upon exerting its own power, or the power of whoever is in control of the state. In those circumstances, this separation of the
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oppressed ethnic minority may be the only answer, and it is not
simply bloodshed that may justify it. I'll use bloodshed metaphorically. A minority may be systematically trampled upon, its culture
denigrated. There are minorities in America that fit that description absolutely, even post-slavery. So maybe during different
stages in history the minority will feel, even shy of bloodshed, that
it is at the bottom of the heap in its state and that it will remain
there forever unless it is given the right to participate in some
meaningful way in shaping its own destiny, as through autonomy
schemes.
That, to me, is a powerful claim. But, I take it as a reaction
to the denial of the ideal in the larger society of opening up, in a
genuine way, opportunity and possibility of growth to all. Therefore, it is the second best. If the people in charge are not going
to permit these other groups to rise, as those people themselves
must have risen, the alternative may become bloodshed, fragmentation, or simply systemic, ongoing oppression. That is why I
would never state that group autonomy rights are necessarily a
denial of human rights.
Participant:If lawyers and universities looked at the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and tried to find these
group rights in the three articles you mentioned, they would discover that the individual rights, to some extent, also cover some
group rights. It was very important that you mentioned the fact
that a declaration on minority rights is now also under discussion
in the United Nations. But while the distinction between these two
types of rights, group rights and individual rights, is perhaps a
little less problematic for analytical jurisprudence, it is of particular importance for practical policy making and practical politicians.
I think this contradiction cannot be understood and explained
unless we add to the notions of individual rights and group rights
a third notion: democracy, or the regime of democracy.
The maximum form of exercising your group rights is collective exit or separation, excision. But there are no guarantees that
this new subdivision, let it be a state, will not be a totalitarian
regime, or a new form of suppression. For example, subdivisions
in Russia today want to separate themselves from the democratic
government of Russia and introduce the classical communist government as it existed in 1945. And now the world community
must decide how to weigh these possibilities, because it is not rare
that the acceptance of a group right, or the maximum group right

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1561

to secede, or to create a state, may directly violate the individual
human rights, such as freedom of speech, because the group right
and the political structure of the group may be nondemocratic.
Professor Steiner: I agree very much with what you said. I think it is
absolutely the dilemma. I don't know enough about the Soviet
Union to make the kinds of judgments that you make, but I have
met numbers of people from the southern republics, and the
South's determination to secede is very real. One of the questions
posed is what will a break-up there, or in Yugoslavia, or between
Slovakia and Bohemia, or elsewhere, mean for the individual?
The question must focus on the welfare of the individual. And
if you are going to find a former Soviet Union in which each
group is hostile behind barbed wire, keeping every other language
and religion out, it is not going to be an advance in civilization.
In some respects, it may be an advance on what was an extreme
of authoritarian control from the center. So those are exactly the
contradictions and the uncertainties I have in mind. It is so hard
to make gross abstract judgments about what is right in these
different situations the way we can say, "You have a right not to
be tortured."
Professor Le. We have time for one last question.
Participant: We have so far talked about the problem as if there
were a tension between staying behind the barbed wire and going
across the barbed wire. I certainly grant you that, but in addition,
as it is very often with tensions in dialectics, does not the one, in
fact, almost further the other? I think many of these determination demands are made because there is not participation because
of the 80/20 percent. The minority, in fact, withdraws in order to
participate at times. I have often thought that maybe we need a
new concept, which we might call "deferred statehood," meaning
that the minority holds off the possibility of separating entirely, or
is willing to defer separation, so that it has that space, and then it
explores from that separate position the possibility of continuing
linkage. And, in fact, I think that some of the inter-ethnic relations in Southeast Asia preliminary to the colonial period have
features of this concurrent connection and distance, and I would
like to ask whether we could borrow some of that.
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Professor Steiner It may be that some modern version of a humane
conception of the older empires would be a suitable alternative to
the modern exclusive state as a way of thinking of achieving this
kind of diversity. It may be the way Western Europe is going, unlike Eastern Europe. I certainly don't think we should view the
present state as an absolute given which must forever continue in
its present form as the basic unit of an international system.
These have been useful and good questions for me to think
about. You probably know more about colonialism than I do. But
it seems to me from what I do know that there are two contradictory strands: one is, the rape of native cultures, at every level from
pop culture to traditional land holding and status. At another
level, it was not in the interest of the colonials to rule every
square inch of turf, and there was a lot of diversity left among the
many principalities in, say, India: the Muslim communities and the
Hindu communities, the North and the South.
In many post-colonial states, the oppressive power of the center, all the way from tax power to the infusion of a particular
form of culture, often a. Western-derived, modernizing kind of
culture, is far more powerful than what was present under colonials who were content to extract their riches, keep the locals in
order, suppress rebellion, and otherwise let local life go on, and
when necessary divide and conquer by setting one group against
another.
So there is this two-edge way of thinking about the post-colonial, self-determining state and its effects on tribal structures, or
different ethnic communities.
What was the thrust of your second question?
Participant (repeated): Whether we should recognize the tension
or, in fact, see the mutual aspects of these two forms; separating
in order to participate.
Professor Steiner. Yes, and maybe we'll have to experiment with
lots of forms that way. Recall the attempt to create the City of
Mandela a while back, which was an attempt by a group of blacks
living in the Boston area, in a place called Roxbury, to form their
own self-governing community.
If you really do feel blocked out of a large political process,
and you have no access to City Hall, different forms of community
organization and devolution of power to community groups may
be an alternative that I would encourage.
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On the other hand, I'm saying that under the American Constitution, hence under constraints that are ethnically or religiously
defined. This may raise thorny problems under our Constitution.
Nonetheless, I'm all for experimenting in a lot of different ways
that would be ongoing ways of living together or learning from
each other.

